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Toward a 21st-Century International Tax Regime
by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Kimberly A. Clausing

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is the Irwin I. Cohn
Professor of Law at University of Michigan Law
School in Ann Arbor, and Kimberly A. Clausing
is the Thormund Miller and Walter Mintz
Professor of Economics at Reed College in
Portland, Oregon.
The authors would like to thank Fadi
Shaheen and David Spencer for their helpful
comments.
In this article, the authors argue that the
United States should consider adopting salesbased formulary apportionment and applying
it to all large enterprises because it is more
likely to lead to a stable outcome than recent
OECD proposals and has important advantages
relative to other proposals such as residual
profit allocation by income or the destinationbased cash flow tax.

with the U.K. diverted profits tax (2015),
Australia’s multinational anti-tax-avoidance law
(2015), and India’s equalization levy (2016), it has
become clear that many countries are unwilling to
live with a situation in which large U.S.
technology companies (such as Amazon, Apple,
Facebook, Google, and Netflix) earn billions in
profits by exploiting their consumer base and
1
paying little tax. More recently, the digital
services taxes adopted by Italy (2018) and France
(2019) and proposed in the United Kingdom and
the EU have threatened to undermine the entire
system. The United States has threatened to
impose retaliatory tariffs on France, and an
escalating trade war could ensue.2
Profit shifting and corporate tax base erosion
are large problems with serious revenue
consequences for non-haven countries. Prior work
suggests revenue losses for the U.S. government
in excess of $100 billion per year by 2015, with
costs for all non-haven countries likely exceeding
3
$300 billion per year. While researchers disagree
on the magnitude of the problem, most analyses
that rely on survey or tax data (which allow one to
measure tax haven income, unlike financial
reporting databases) find comparably large
magnitudes of revenue loss because of profit

1

Background
The international tax regime is almost a
century old, and it is showing its age. In recent
decades, the regime could be maintained despite
increasing evidence that some of its key
components, such as the arm’s-length standard or
permanent establishment threshold, were unfit
for a 21st-century economy. However, starting
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, AUGUST 26, 2019

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “Three Steps Forward, One Step Back?
Reflections on ‘Google Taxes’ and the Destination-Based Corporate Tax,”
2016(2) Nordic Tax J. 69 (2016).
2

Ana Swanson, “U.S. Announces Inquiry of French Digital Tax That
May End in Tariffs,” The New York Times, July 10, 2019. Another option for
the United States is to impose retaliatory taxes on French companies
under IRC sections 891 and 896, as suggested by Itai Grinberg in “A
Constructive U.S. Counter to EU State Aid Cases,” Tax Notes Int’l, Jan. 11,
2016, p. 167.
3

See Kimberly A. Clausing, “The Effect of Profit Shifting on the
Corporate Tax Base in the United States and Beyond,” 69(4) Nat. Tax J.
905 (Dec. 2016); and Clausing, “Profit Shifting Before and After the Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act,” SSRN (Nov. 21, 2018).
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4

shifting. At a time when government budgets are
tight and income inequality has risen
substantially, protecting the corporate tax base
5
serves both revenue and fairness goals.
The OECD’s base erosion and profit-shifting
project was supposed to respond to those
challenges to the international tax regime, and
action 1 was meant to address digital taxation.
While the process certainly represented a step
forward for international cooperation on those
issues, the myriad suggested guidelines were far
from an end to the problem of corporate tax base
erosion. Moreover, the OECD was unable to reach
a consensus on action 1, so the can was kicked
down the road, with an interim report published
in 2018 and a final report due in 2020 intended to
provide a consensus-based long-term solution.
In February the OECD issued a public
consultation document that includes two
6
proposals for taxing the digital economy. The first
is a global anti-base-erosion minimum tax
proposal that builds on the U.S. global intangible
low-taxed income regime and base erosion and
antiabuse tax. The idea is to implement the singletax principle by imposing residence-based
taxation when the source tax is too low and
imposing source-based taxation when the
residence tax is too low.7 That is a relatively simple
extension of existing principles, but it begs the
question of how much profit should be allocated

4

See OECD, “Measuring and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11 — 2015
Final Report” (2015); Gabriel Zucman, The Hidden Wealth of Nations
(2015); Joint Committee on Taxation, “Estimates of Federal Tax
Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2014-2018,” JCX-97-14 (Aug. 5, 2014); Fatih
Guvenen et al., “Offshore Profit Shifting and Domestic Productivity
Measurement,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
No. 23324 (Apr. 2017); and Thomas R. Tørsløv, Ludvig S. Wier, and
Gabriel Zucman, “The Missing Profits of Nations,” NBER Working
Paper No. 24701 (June 2018).
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to the source jurisdiction: A GILTI-type,
residence-based minimum tax works well only if
there is a consensus on profit allocation, because it
envisages granting foreign tax credits for sourcecountry taxes on profits properly allocable to the
source country. Similarly, a BEAT-type minimum
tax that extends to all deductible payments
(including cost of goods sold) requires agreement
by the residence jurisdiction to prevent double
8
taxation.
The OECD recognized that, and so laid out
three alternative options for profit allocation in
the context of digitalization. All three eliminate
the physical presence requirement for having a PE
but take different approaches to determining how
much profits should be subject to tax in the source
(or market) jurisdiction.
The narrowest option is the user participation
proposal, which applies only to companies like
Facebook, Google, and Amazon and lets the
market jurisdiction tax profits attributable to user
participation. It would apply only to U.S. tech
giants, fueling U.S. government wariness. The
United States countered with a broader option,
the marketing intangible proposal, which would
allocate residuals arising under the traditional,
arm’s-length-based profit-split method to the
market jurisdiction. It would apply to all
companies, and builds on the U.S. government
experience in Glaxo, in which the EU company
paid $3.4 billion in tax to the U.S. government,
based on marketing intangibles allocated to the
9
United States.
Those two proposals, while radical in
abandoning the traditional PE concept, still build
on the arm’s-length standard because they
allocate residuals to the market (or user)
jurisdiction only after routine profits have been
allocated using the arm’s-length standard.

5

Beyond that, a strong corporate tax is an important part of an
efficient tax system, and it helps protect the tax base against other forms
of erosion. For more on the arguments in defense of the corporate tax,
see Clausing, “Strengthening the Indispensable U.S. Corporate Tax,”
Equitable Growth (Sept. 12, 2016).
6

OECD, “Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalisation of the
Economy” (2019). See also OECD, “Programme of Work to Develop a
Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising From the
Digitalisation of the Economy” (May 2019).
7

On the single-tax principle, see Avi-Yonah, “International Taxation
of Electronic Commerce,” 52 Tax L. Rev. 507 (1997); Avi-Yonah, “Who
Invented the Single Tax Principle? An Essay on the History of U.S. Treaty
Policy,” 59 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 305 (2015); and Gianluca Mazzoni,
“Complete Distributive Rules and the Single Tax Principle: A Review of
Recent Italian Case Law,” 73 Bull. Int’l Tax’n (Feb. 20, 2019).

840

8

That problem is why the BEAT as enacted does not include the
House proposal to include cost of goods sold in the payments subject to
the BEAT, even though doing so leaves a gaping hole.
9

Glaxo involved an asserted deficiency of $30 billion as a result of the
IRS’s contention that more profit from Zantac, a drug developed in the
United Kingdom and sold in the United States, should be allocated to
marketing intangibles. The case was settled in 2006 for $3.4 billion in tax,
but the United Kingdom refused to accept the shift of $10 billion in profit
to the United States. Thus, Glaxo was double taxed. See Avi-Yonah and
Mazzoni, “The Apple State Aid Decision: The Wrong Way to Enforce the
Benefits Principle?” Tax Notes Int’l, Nov. 28, 2016, p. 837.
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Similarly, the residual profit allocation by income
(RPA-I) proposal builds on the arm’s-length
standard in allocating routine profits but allocates
residual (non-routine) profits to the destination
jurisdiction.10 While RPA-I is an extension of a
11
2009 proposal, it retains the arm’s-length
standard to determine routine profits (whereas
the 2009 proposal assumes a rate of returns on
costs) and allocates residual profits based on a
measure of those profits that considers both sales
and the allocable expenses attributed to those
sales, as well as a routine profit. The RPA-I
proposal is more limited than an earlier proposal,
the destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT),12
which was included in the 2016 House GOP
blueprint for tax reform but was not included in
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97).
The third option in the OECD consultation is
more extreme, because it not only abandons the
PE for a significant economic presence threshold
13
(similar to the proposed EU directive) but also
explicitly abandons the arm’s-length standard in
favor of what it calls a “fractional apportionment
method,” which is based on the formulary
14
approach recently adopted by India. That is a
remarkable turnaround by the OECD, which has
traditionally resisted any attempt to replace the
15
arm’s-length standard with a formulary method.
However, the fractional apportionment option is a
latecomer and seems unlikely to be favored over

© 2019 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
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the two more traditional and better-developed
options.16
In what follows, we will first address the
OECD proposals in Section I. In Section II, we
discuss other proposals that have been discussed
in more academic proposals but not enacted as
legislation (RPA-I and DBCFT). Finally, we revisit
our 2007 sales-based formulary apportionment
17
proposal in Section III.
I. The Two Main OECD Proposals
The user participation proposal in the OECD
program is an attempt by the EU to impose
income tax on those U.S. tech giants (Amazon,
Facebook, and Google) that derive revenue
18
primarily from advertising. The proposal has
been criticized as intellectually vague and
difficult to administer.19 While those kinds of
arguments can be made against digital services
taxes, it has been convincingly argued that a user
20
network adds value. The ability of Amazon,
Facebook, and Google to sell user data to
advertisers is the key to their business model.
The problem with user participation,
however, is that it is limited to Amazon,
Facebook, and Google; even Apple and Netflix are
not affected because their main source of revenue
is not advertising (nor is Spotify’s, the EU’s big
tech contender). The United States has responded
with the marketing intangibles proposal, which
would apply to all corporations. But it has been
convincingly argued that the proposal does
nothing to resolve the transfer pricing mess
because it is impossible to separate marketing
from other intangibles, and any attempt to do so

10

See Michael P. Devereux et al., “Residual Profit Allocation by
Income,” Working Paper 19/01 of the International Tax Group and the
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2019-04 (Mar.
2019).
11

Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Michael C. Durst, “Allocating Business
Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split,”
9 Fla. Tax Rev. 497 (2009).
12

Alan J. Auerbach et al., “Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxation,”
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 17/01
(Jan. 2017).
13

European Parliament, “Corporate Taxation of a Significant Digital
Presence,” Briefing (2018).
14

OECD, supra note 6, at 16. See also Indian Department of Revenue,
Central Board of Direct Taxes, “Public Consultation on the Proposal for
Amendment of Rules for Profit Attribution to Permanent
Establishment,” F. No. 500/33/2017-FTD.I (Apr. 18, 2019). On the Indian
proposal, see Avi-Yonah and Ajitesh Kir, “India’s New Profit Attribution
Proposal and the Arm’s-Length Standard,” Tax Notes Int’l, June 17, 2019,
p. 1183.
15

OECD, “Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
and Tax Administrations 2017” (July 10, 2017).
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16

See OECD, supra note 6, at 9:
To date, the discussion has focused primarily on two of these
proposals, the user participation proposal and the marketing
intangible proposal, where a number of commonalities emerged. A
detailed discussion of the concept of significant economic presence
is also taking place, but this concept was revisited more recently.

17

Clausing and Avi-Yonah, “Reforming Corporate Taxation in a
Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment,” The
Brookings Institution Discussion Paper 2007-08 (June 2007).
18

This section addresses the two more traditional OECD proposals,
user participation and marketing intangibles. Fractional apportionment
and the Indian proposal are covered in Section III.
19

Itai Grinberg, “User Participation in Value Creation,” Brit. Tax Rev.
407 (2018).
20

Wei Cui, “The Digital Services Tax: A Conceptual Defense” (Apr.
22, 2019).
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risks double taxation, as happened in the leading
marketing intangibles case, Glaxo.21
Thus, neither of the lead OECD proposals is
likely to bring about a stable international tax
regime fit for 21st-century conditions. They both
are an attempt to adopt minimal tweaks — but
radical surgery is needed.
II. The RPA-I and DBCFT Proposals
RPA-I is an adaptation of a 2009 proposal. It
improves on the earlier proposal in detail,
addressing several issues not fully considered,
such as interest allocation and losses. Yet, it still
suffers from a major drawback: It uses the arm’slength standard to tax routine profits. Relying on
that standard makes the proposal more palatable
and familiar to practitioners but means that it also
retains some of the standard’s flaws. Moreover,
while the 2009 proposal simply adopts a standard
numerical value for routine profits, RPA-I seeks to
segregate the routine from the extraordinary by
keeping the arm’s-length standard in place and
relying on an analysis of comparables to calculate
routine profits, which creates substantial
complexity and administrative costs.
The RPA-I proposal allocates residual profits
based on a measure of those profits that considers
both sales and the allocable expenses attributed to
those sales, as well as a routine profit, whereas the
2009 proposal allocated residual profits based on
destination of sales. Often the two outcomes will
be similar, but the allocation based on residual
income is more suited to situations in which
profit-to-cost ratios would naturally vary
substantially by country. Still, that choice
introduces substantial complexity.
The RPA-I reform is clearly a hybrid, using
aspects of both the arm’s-length standard and
formulary approaches. It is a compromise
between systems, and it is also a compromise in
terms of which jurisdictions get the revenue from
taxation; source countries tax the routine profits,
and destination countries tax the residual profits.
In comparison with India’s full-fledged
adoption of formulary apportionment, RPA-I
stops short of fundamental reform. The proposal’s
drafters acknowledge that it is also a large step

© 2019 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
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back from the more fundamental reform of the
DBCFT, primarily because the events of 2016-2017
indicated that a DBCFT is hard to enact because of
opposition from importers.
In addition to the politics, there are serious
problems with the DBCFT (which have been
explored at length elsewhere22). The main
difference between a DBCFT and sales-based
formulary apportionment is that under a DBCFT,
a border tax is needed because the full value of
goods and services is taxed by not allowing any
deduction for imports. As recognized by
proponents and observers, the DBCFT is
equivalent to a VAT with a deduction for wages,
and as previously argued, that kind of tax is
incompatible with the WTO rules, in addition to
23
its other flaws.
The WTO incompatibility risks further
pressure on the world trading system at a time
when those kinds of pressures are substantial. The
DBCFT is incompatible with U.S. treaty
obligations. Further, unless U.S. trading partners
adopt their own DBCFT, U.S. adoption will harm
them, increasing their profit-shifting problems.
Absent smooth exchange-rate adjustment, the
DBCFT also risks creating large sector-specific
shocks. While economists are quite capable of
showing in models why the exchange rate fully
adjusts, experience with countries adopting VATs
challenges that easy consensus. There are four
developed countries that have adopted VATs
during the floating exchange-rate era, and in all
cases, the exchange rate did not adjust as
smoothly as predicted; in some cases, the
movement of the exchange rate was the wrong
24
sign. And, even if the exchange rate does change
as expected, that comes with larger risks to the
global economy.
Further, because of the wage deduction, there
will be difficult issues with tax refunds that are
not present with VATs. Indeed, many exporters
would be expected to report losses, and absent

22

See Avi-Yonah and Clausing, “Problems with Destination-Based
Corporate Taxes and the Ryan Blueprint,” 8 Colum. J. Tax L. 229 (2017).
23

Id.

24

21

David L. Forst, “One World, Two Transfer Pricing Laws: What’s to
Be Done?” Tax Notes, Apr. 22, 2019, p. 551.

842

Of course, there are many reasons why exchange rates move, but
that is part of the point. Indeed, models of exchange rates are quite poor
at predicting their future value. See Kenneth Rogoff, “Perspectives on
Exchange Rate Variability,” Int’l Capital Flows 441 (1999), as summarized
in Avi-Yonah and Clausing, supra note 22.
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full loss rebates, there would be a strong incentive
for inefficient mergers. There are also important
questions regarding how financial companies and
transactions would be handled, how U.S. state
corporate tax systems would be affected, and how
the transition to the new tax system would be
25
addressed.
The inability of the GOP majority and White
House to enact a DBCFT in 2017 bears out some of
those concerns and indicates that the tax is not a
viable unilateral reform option for the United
States. The opposition from importers like
Walmart and Target doomed the DBCFT, despite
the reassurances of some economists that
exchange-rate adjustments would offset any tax
liability on imports.
III. Sales-Based Formulary Apportionment
Sales-based formulary apportionment is an
improvement over the proposals in sections II and
III, and it should be seriously considered by the
United States for adoption. Multilateral adoption
is ideal, but there is also a strong case for
unilateral adoption, after due attention to
26
transition and implementation issues.
On April 18 the Indian Central Board of Direct
Taxes released a public consultation document on
amending India’s rules for profit attribution to
PEs.27 This is the first time a national government
has officially proposed abandoning the arm’slength standard, the governing standard for
dividing business profits among taxing
jurisdictions since the 1930s, and replacing it with
a system that bears close resemblance to the
historic rival of the arm’s-length standard,
28
formulary apportionment.

25

For further discussion, see Avi-Yonah and Clausing, supra note 22.

26

This discussion updates and summarizes our 2007 proposal, which
discusses many of these points in more detail. See Clausing and AviYonah, supra note 17.
27

F. No. 500/33/2017-FTD.I, supra note 14.

28

On the history of that debate see, e.g., Avi-Yonah, “The Rise and
Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International
Taxation,” 15 Va. Tax Rev. 89 (1995); Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst,
supra note 11; Avi-Yonah, “Between Formulary Apportionment and the
OECD Guidelines: A Proposal for Reconciliation,” 2 World Tax J. 3 (2010);
Avi-Yonah and Ilan Benshalom, “Formulary Apportionment: Myths and
Prospects — Promoting Better International Policy and Utilizing the
Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative,” 3 World
Tax J. 371 (2011); and Sol Picciotto, “Taxing Multinational Enterprises as
Unitary Firms,” International Centre for Tax and Development Working
Paper 53 (June 2016).
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Unlike the other well-known proposal for
replacing the arm’s-length standard, the
European Commission’s common consolidated
29
corporate tax base proposal, the Indian proposal
has a good chance of becoming law after the
recent Indian national election. The OECD has
reflected the Indian proposal in the third option in
its public consultation document on the digital
economy.
Like the Indian proposal, the third OECD
option is extreme because it not only abandons
the PE for a significant economic presence
threshold (similar to the proposed EU directive)30
but also abandons the arm’s-length standard in
favor of what it calls a fractional apportionment
method. That is a remarkable step by the OECD,
which has traditionally resisted any attempt to
replace the arm’s-length standard with a
formulary method, even rejecting formulas for
allocating residuals (which by definition arise
only in the absence of comparables) at the
31
beginning of the BEPS process in 2013. The
OECD is here envisaging taking the global profit
rate of a multinational enterprise and applying it
to revenue from a jurisdiction to determine the
potential tax base, and then apportioning that tax
base by using the traditional three-factor formula
(used by U.S. states and the CCCTB). It then adds
a users factor, because Facebook, for example,
might not have any direct sales (as opposed to
revenue from showing ads), assets, or employees
in a given jurisdiction. There is no mention of
using the traditional arm’s-length standard when
possible or allocating residuals based only on user
participation or marketing intangibles, as in the
other two proposals.
As stated above, although India is going
ahead, the OECD seems unlikely to embrace its
proposal and more likely to adopt some
combination of user participation and marketing
intangibles (the EU and U.S. proposals) instead.
But the Indian proposal is important because it
shows that formulary apportionment can be
implemented unilaterally.

29

See European Commission, “Common Consolidated Corporate Tax
Base (CCCTB)” (2016).
30
31

See European Parliament, supra note 13.
See OECD transfer pricing guidelines, supra note 15.
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For the United States, sales-based formulary
apportionment has many advantages. First, it is
well suited to its complex, global, technologically
sophisticated economy. In contrast to the arm’slength standard, which presumes that companies
earn the same amount of profit when they are
integrated as they would at arm’s length, salesbased formulary apportionment acknowledges
that multinationals earn additional profits, which
might not be easily sourced (even in the abstract)
to particular countries, because of the benefits of
their global production processes.
While it has long been recognized that both
the supply and demand side of the market create
value, demand is far easier to measure than
supply. The source of supply-side value is
increasingly ambiguous; value is not just created
by machinery and labor. Intangible assets and the
value of user data (in the digital economy) also
create value.
A crucial argument for sales-based formulary
apportionment is that it reduces tax competition
pressures. Because profit shifting is shut down,
and customers are relatively immobile,
companies have limited ability to adjust their
operations to reduce their tax obligations, which
preserves governments’ abilities to levy their
desired tax rates without fear of base erosion.
In contrast, under the arm’s-length standard,
ambiguities about the proper source of income
create many opportunities for tax avoidance, and
companies are more than happy to arrange their
finances so that income is booked in the most
lightly taxed jurisdiction, often going so far as to
create income that is completely stateless (and
thus free of tax). Of the foreign income reported in
the U.S. Treasury’s 2016 country-by-country
database, 22 percent is classified as stateless, and
an additional 37 percent is classified in known
32
havens with very low tax rates.
Because of that massive profit shifting, the
U.S. government is losing substantial corporate
tax revenues, a problem far larger than it was
when the 2007 proposal was drafted. Before the
TCJA, estimates indicated revenue loss in excess
32

The income totals appear to miss some income that shows up in
other Treasury data sources, perhaps as a result of incomplete coverage
of the country-by-country company sample in 2016. This only includes a
subset of havens: Bahamas, Bermuda, Caymans, Ireland, Netherlands,
Puerto Rico, and Singapore.
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of $100 billion a year. While the TCJA reduced
profit-shifting incentives in some respects, it
increased them in others, and analyses by the
Joint Committee on Taxation indicate that the
revenue effects of the international provisions of
34
the legislation were approximately neutral.
Ignoring the one-time repatriation revenue
(which represents a tax cut relative to prior law),
the international provisions actually lose $14
billion in revenue over the 10-year estimate
window. Still, because the new corporate tax rate
is lower, that will mechanically lower the revenue
costs of profit shifting (because the foregone profit
would now be taxed at a lower rate).
35
Also, as has been recounted elsewhere, the
arm’s-length standard generates extraordinary
complexity, and while there would of course be
transition and implementation issues with a
formulary system, on net the vast complexity of
the current system would be substantially
diminished. As one indication of the complexity
of addressing BEPS in the context of the arm’slength standard, the first round of the OECD
BEPS process generated nearly 2,000 pages in
guidelines. Moreover, the slew of international
provisions in the TCJA (including GILTI, BEAT,
and foreign-derived intangible income) hardly
simplifies matters.
Of course, there are also arguments against
sales-based formulary apportionment. Some
simply stem from confusion. For example, while
profits are allocated to tax bases based on the
destination of sales, the incidence of the tax is very
much the same as the incidence of a profits tax,
not a VAT. Indeed, companies without profits
would pay no tax, and the normal return to capital
could be exempted from tax (or taxed more

33

See Clausing, “Profit Shifting Before and After the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act” (Jan. 29, 2019).
34

Territorial treatment of foreign income increases the incentive to
shift profit abroad because of the absence of tax on repatriation. The
minimum taxes (BEAT and GILTI) and the lower statutory rate should
reduce profit-shifting incentives. According to the JCT, the net impact of
all international provisions is (very slightly) negative, setting to one side
the one-time repatriation tax on past earnings; see “Estimated Budget
Effects of the Conference Agreement for H.R.1, The ‘Tax Cuts And Jobs
Act,’” JCX-67-17 (Dec. 18, 2017).
35

See Clausing and Avi-Yonah, supra note 17.
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lightly) by including expensing (or partial
expensing).36
Some argue that sales-based formulary
apportionment would tilt revenues too much
away from developing countries toward countries
with rich markets. However, it is important to
note that less developed countries have even
larger revenue losses (as a share of GDP) from
corporate tax avoidance and profit shifting than
developed ones and thus stand to especially gain
from proposals that stem profit shifting,
37
especially those that are easy to administer.
The data on U.S. MNEs illustrate that
phenomenon nicely. In 2015 the share of foreign
direct investment earnings of U.S. affiliates that
are in major, less developed countries is 8.5
38
percent after tax and 12 percent before tax. Those
shares are far lower than the share of real
activities in those countries; the less developed
countries host 22 percent of sales, 48 percent of
employment, and 22 percent of employee
compensation.39
Also, studies that simulate the effects of salesbased formulary apportionment systems
sometimes neglect to consider that MNE sales
data are likely distorted by tax avoidance, and a
clean administration of sales-based formulary
apportionment could be expected to more
accurately tax the true destination of sales. Of
course, countries with substantial natural
resource rents (for example, because of extractive
industries) should likely retain source taxation for
those streams of income.
Another key argument against rapid adoption
of sales-based formulary apportionment is that it
is too radical because it completely abandons not
just PEs but also the arm’s-length standard. Of
36

The normal returns on debt-financed investments are typically
already exempt from taxation even without expensing, if interest costs
are deductible.
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course, India is about to do precisely that, and we
can learn from its experience.
One problem with the Indian proposal (as
well as the CCCTB) is the formula, which is an
adaptation of the traditional U.S. state formula of
assets, payroll, and sales. As shown in the 2007
proposal, including assets and payroll can lead to
job losses for the United States because MNEs
might move assets and payroll to lower-tax
jurisdictions.40 That argues in favor of sales-based
formulary apportionment.
However, comprehensive evidence from U.S.
states indicates that formula factors are not
41
particularly sensitive to taxes. Indeed, that
evidence fits with literature in public finance that
shows that real factors (such as employment,
tangible assets, and customers) are far less
sensitive to taxation than financial factors (such as
42
income). Still, the U.S. state experience might be
insufficient to dispel fears of factor mobility in
response to taxation, especially because typical
state tax rates are far lower than typical central
government tax rates. That said, tax competition
is also expected to be fiercer at the state level
because there are fewer economic frictions
between states (for example, borders, trade
barriers, and language differences) than between
countries.
A multifactor formula might balance the
political concern that market locations benefit
more from sales-based formulary apportionment
than production locations. Those kinds of
concerns might lie behind the compromise
proposal of RPA-I because routine revenues are
given to source locations, whereas residual
revenues are given to market locations. However,
RPA-I also retains the complexity of the arm’slength standard, so an alternative approach
would be to use a multifactor formula. A possible
compromise formula would weight both the

37

See IMF, “Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy,” IMF Policy
Paper (Mar. 2019). See also Ernesto Crivelli, Ruud de Mooij, and Michael
Keen, “Base Erosion, Profit Shifting and Developing Countries,” 72
FinanzArchiv: Pub. Fin. Analysis 268 (2016).
38

Data are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis surveys of U.S.
multinationals using revised 2015 data. The major developing countries
used for the purpose of this calculation are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria,
Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela.
39

Id. The developing country share of assets is only 9 percent, likely
reflecting the tax sensitivity of assets, and their share of gross income is
also 9 percent.

TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, AUGUST 26, 2019

40

See Clausing and Avi-Yonah, supra note 17.

41

See Clausing, “The U.S. State Experience Under Formulary
Apportionment: Are There Lessons for International Reform?” 69 Nat’l
Tax J. 353. That is in contrast to studies that rely on simulations, which
often simply assume that factors are tax responsive, rather than relying
on the actual experience with formulary apportionment.
42

See Auerbach and Joel Slemrod, “The Economic Effects of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986,” 35 J. Econ. Lit. 589 (June 1997); and Emmanuel Saez,
Slemrod, and Seth H. Giertz, “The Elasticity of Taxable Income With
Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review,” 50 J. Econ. Lit. 3 (Mar.
2012).
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market and production jurisdictions at 50 percent,
using a combination of payroll and employee
43
headcount to capture the production side.
Still, absent international agreement on the
ideal formula, one concern with multifactor
formulas is that they may prove harder to
harmonize across countries. The U.S. experience
suggests that states have a strong incentive to
increase the weight on the sales factors, often in
response to lobbying by companies with local
44
production. And, of course, if different countries
adopt different formulas, that can create double
taxation or double nontaxation.
While it would be ideal to adopt formulary
apportionment multilaterally, the United States
should strongly consider unilateral adoption,
because multilateral adoption is likely infeasible.
Unilateral action provides incentives for other
countries to adopt, leading to a stable 21st-century
international tax regime. As argued in 2007,
unilateral adoption pressures other countries to
adopt because otherwise their MNEs will move
operations (and shift profits) to the United
45
States. That will not change an MNE’s tax
obligations in the United States (because it does
not change its U.S. sales) or in third countries
(because there is no PE), but it will reduce its tax
payments in its home country. Without foreign
adoption, U.S.-based MNEs that sell abroad will
have a tax advantage over foreign MNEs. At the
same time, all MNEs that access the U.S. market
will pay U.S. tax.
Another critique of sales-based formulary
apportionment is the need to get other countries
to agree to the formula to prevent double taxation,
but the experience with VAT has shown that a
treaty is not needed for every country to adopt the
destination basis unilaterally. Double taxation or
double nontaxation might still occur, but it will
diminish if other countries follow suit.
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The argument that sales-based formulary
apportionment cannot be implemented
unilaterally because the necessary information is
unavailable will be undermined by the Indian
proposal. The experience with the VAT also shows
that it is possible to establish the destination of
services and intangible goods. Tangible goods, of
course, are inherently less problematic.
A final common critique of sales-based
formulary apportionment by DBCFT proponents
is that unlike a DBCFT, it is possible to game
apportionment by selling through thin margin
distributors in low-tax jurisdictions. But as noted,
that problem can be solved by looking through
46
the thin margin distributor. Moreover, it is
unlikely that companies such as Apple would
give up control over the distribution of their
products.
As a way of indicating how sales-based
formulary apportionment might work, the
appendix to this article provides draft legislative
language for sales-based formulary
apportionment. The key elements are:
(a) Sales-based formulary apportionment
applies to all enterprises (incorporated or
not) with sales (or licenses) of goods or
services into the United States that exceed
a threshold (for example, $1 million,
adjusted for inflation). The threshold is
needed to exclude (foreign or domestic)
small business from the business tax and
to replace the PE threshold, which is
47
obsolete.
(b) Sales-based formulary apportionment
is based on common control, without
48
attempting to define unitary enterprises.

46

See Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst, supra note 11; see also the
legislative language in Avi-Yonah, “Destination Based Corporate Tax:
An Alternative Approach,” University of Michigan Law & Economics
Research Paper No. 16-028 (Dec. 12, 2016).
43

That is a compromise to production jurisdictions that would
account for both labor intensity (with headcount) and high-income
employees (with payroll). Assets are omitted because of the greater
mobility of capital (than labor), and thus greater tax sensitivity, as well as
the greater difficulty of measuring the value of assets, which opens
opportunities for tax avoidance.
44

While states have been eager to increase the weight on the sales
factor, there is little evidence that those decisions ultimately affect the
location of jobs or assets across U.S. states. See Clausing, supra note 40.
45

See Clausing and Avi-Yonah, supra note 17.
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47

Because enterprises with gross receipts below $1 million are
exempt from tax, the IRS will need to enforce the personal holding
company and accumulated earnings tax rules to prevent high-income
individuals from sheltering their income in those exempt enterprises.
Alternatively, passthrough treatment for small enterprises could be
required.
48

That simplifying feature could cause high-profit-margin
enterprises to acquire low-profit-margin ones to benefit from their sales
into lower-tax jurisdictions, but if the tax rate is too low, the sales do not
count. It is possible to ignore those kinds of tax-motivated acquisitions
under IRC section 269 or a revised version of section 382.
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(c) Sales-based formulary apportionment
defines destination based on the proposed
CCCTB, which builds on the EU
experience with VAT. Sales of goods are
treated as made into the United States if
the dispatch or transport of the goods to
the person acquiring them ends in the
United States, supplies of services are
treated as made into the United States if
the services are physically carried out in or
actually supplied into the United States,
and licensing of intangibles are treated as
made into the United States if the royalty
income resulting from that licensing is
sourced to the United States under U.S.49
sourcing rules in IRC 861(a)(4).

interruption in shipment of goods shall not
constitute such country the country of
destination. However, if at the time of a sale
of personal property or services or license
of intangibles to an unrelated person the
enterprise knew, or should have known
from the facts and circumstances
surrounding the transaction, that the
property probably would not be used,
consumed, or disposed of in the country of
destination, the enterprise must determine
the country of ultimate use, consumption,
or disposition of the property or the
property will be presumed to have been
used, consumed, or disposed of in the
United States.

(d) The thin margin distributor problem is
addressed by using the language in the
base company rule of section 954 that
defines sales outside the country of
incorporation and putting the burden of
proof on the seller:

Further, to prevent manipulation, the
throwout rule used by many states should be
copied, so that receipts from low-tax jurisdictions
(jurisdiction with an effective income tax rate of
less than half the U.S. rate) are not included in the
apportionment formula.

Goods, services, or intangibles that are sold
or licensed to an unrelated person will be
presumed for purposes of this section to
have been sold or licensed for use,
consumption, or disposition in the country
of destination of the property sold or
services provided; for such purpose, the
occurrence in a country of a temporary

IV. Conclusion

49

Alternatively, the destination of sales and services could be
determined based on the proposed FDII regulations, applied to both
imports (subject to tax under sales-based formulary apportionment) and
exports (not subject to tax under apportionment). Section 250(b)(4)(A)
provides that foreign-derived deduction-eligible income (FDDEI)
includes income from property the taxpayer sells to any person who is
not a U.S. person, and which the taxpayer establishes to the satisfaction
of the secretary is for a foreign use. Accordingly, the proposed
regulations define an FDDEI sale as a sale of property to a foreign person
for a foreign use. They state that a recipient is treated as a foreign person
only if the seller obtains documentation of the recipient’s foreign status
and does not know or have reason to know that the recipient is not a
foreign person. They also provide several types of permissible
documentation for that purpose, such as a written statement by the
recipient indicating that the recipient is a foreign person. The proposed
regs provide that a sale of property (whether general or intangible
property) is treated as for a foreign use only if the seller obtains
documentation that the property is for a foreign use and does not know
or have reason to know, as of the FDII filing date, that it is not for a
foreign use (or, for intangible property, that the portion of the sale of the
property for which the seller establishes foreign use is not for a foreign
use). The proposed regs state that a sale of intangible property is for a
foreign use if the revenue is earned from exploiting the property outside
the United States, the documentation requirements are satisfied, and the
seller does not know or have reason to know that the portion of the sale
of the intangible property for which the seller establishes foreign use is
not for a foreign use.
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It is clear that the international tax regime
needs to be updated. Corporate tax base erosion
through profit shifting remains a serious problem,
costing non-haven governments substantial
revenue. The OECD has conceded that the PE
threshold must be abandoned and is showing
signs that even the sacrosanct arm’s-length
standard is not immune to revision. One key
question is how to best achieve a stable outcome.
Current OECD and other efforts are flawed.
The user participation proposal is too limited and
the marketing intangibles proposal, as well as the
routine component of the RPA-I, are too
dependent on the flawed arm’s-length standard.
The DBCFT has worthy aspects, but it also has
problems.
Sales-based formulary apportionment has
many of the advantages of RPA-I and DBCFT, but
with fewer downsides. If it were unilaterally
adopted by the United States, many other
countries would have strong incentives to adopt
to protect their corporate tax base. Like the VAT,
sales-based formulary apportionment can be
adopted unilaterally worldwide without the
adoption of a multilateral treaty, a feat proven
elusive over the past century since it was first
envisaged by the League of Nations.
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Appendix: Legislative Language for Sales-Based
Formulary Apportionment
H. R. ____________
AN ACT
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
and for other purposes.
1. Short title; table of contents
(a) Short title
This Act may be cited as the American
Competitiveness Act of 20XX.
(b) Table of contents
The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
[TBA]
2. Tax imposed.
Section 11 of 26 USC is amended as follows:
11(a) ENTERPRISES IN GENERAL
A tax is hereby imposed for each taxable year
on the taxable income of every enterprise
apportioned to the United States.
(b) AMOUNT OF TAX
The amount of the tax imposed by subsection
(a) shall be [xx percent].
(c) Definitions
For purposes of this section,
(1) the term “enterprise” shall mean any
business whose taxable income apportioned to
the United States under this section exceeds the
threshold amount;
(2) The term “threshold amount” shall mean
$1,000,000, increased with respect to taxable years
beginning in any calendar year by the cost of
living adjustment for such calendar year. For
purposes of paragraph (c)(2), the cost of living
adjustment for any calendar year is the
percentage (if any) by which —
(A) the consumer price index for the
preceding calendar year, exceeds (B) the CPI for
the calendar year 2017.
For purposes of this paragraph, the CPI for
any calendar year is the average of the CPI as of
the close of the 12-month period ending on
August 31 of such calendar year. The term
“consumer price index” means the last CPI for all
urban consumers published by the Department of
Labor.
(3) The term “business” shall mean any
person (as defined in section 7701) who sells
goods, provides services, or licenses intangibles
into the United States.
848
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The term “taxable income” shall mean the
total taxable income (as defined in section 63) of
an enterprise from whatever source derived.
(4) The term “apportioned to the United
States” shall mean the total taxable income of each
enterprise multiplied by a fraction whose
numerator is receipts from unrelated customers in
the United States and whose denominator is total
receipts from unrelated customers. See section
11C for determination of the location of receipts.
(5) The term “receipts” shall include sale of
goods, provision of services, or license of
intangibles.
3. Enterprises subject to tax.
Section 11A of 26 USC is added to read as
follows:
(a) For purposes of section 11, the term
“enterprise” shall include every entity treated as a
corporation under Treas. Reg. 301.7701-1 and its
affiliated group. An affiliated group will be
defined as in section 1504, except that —
(1) The percentage in section 1504(a)(2) shall
be 50 percent, and (2) section 1504(b)(3) shall be
disregarded.
(b) In the case of any entity not treated as a
corporation under Treas. Reg. 301.7701-1, the term
“enterprise” shall include any two or more
organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or
not incorporated, whether or not organized in the
United States, and whether or not affiliated)
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the
same interests.
4. Interaction with treaties.
Section 11B of 26 USC is added to read as
follows:
(a) Section 11 shall apply regardless of any
treaty of the United States.
(b) Subject to paragraph (c), in the case of any
country with whom the United States has an
income tax treaty, section 11 shall apply as of the
first taxable year beginning on or after five years
after the enactment of this Act.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (b), section 11
shall take effect immediately in the case of any
country that the secretary determines has failed to
provide information required to carry out the
purposes of this Act.
(d) The secretary is hereby authorized to
suspend the operation of section 11 for a period of
up to five years from the date of enactment of this
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Act for enterprises organized in any country that
is not a member of the OECD.
5. Location of receipts.
Section 11C of 26 USC is added to read as
follows:
(a) For purposes of calculating taxable income
apportioned to the United States under section 11,
receipts shall mean the proceeds of all sales of
goods and supplies of services and licensing of
intangibles after discounts and returns, excluding
taxes and duties. Interest, dividends, and
proceeds from the disposal of fixed assets shall
not be treated as receipts, unless they are revenues
earned in the ordinary course of trade or business.
Sales of goods and supplies of services and
licensing of intangibles within an enterprise (as
defined in section 11) shall not be regarded as
receipts.
(b) Destination of receipts
1. Sales of goods shall be treated as made into
the United States if the dispatch or transport of the
goods to the person acquiring them ends in the
United States.
2. Supplies of services shall be treated as made
into the United States if the services are physically
carried out in or actually supplied into the United
States.
3. Licensing of intangibles shall be treated as
made into the United States if the royalty income
resulting from such licensing is sourced to the
United States under section 861(a)(4).
6. Antiavoidance rules.
Section 11D of 26 USC is added to read as
follows:
(a) For purposes of section 11, goods, services
or intangibles which are sold or licensed to an
unrelated person will be presumed for purposes
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of this section to have been sold or licensed for
use, consumption, or disposition in the country of
destination of the property sold or services or
intangibles provided; for such purpose, the
occurrence in a country of a temporary
interruption in shipment of goods shall not
constitute such country the country of
destination. However, if at the time of a sale of
personal property or services or license of
intangibles to an unrelated person the enterprise
knew, or should have known from the facts and
circumstances surrounding the transaction, that
the property, services or intangibles probably
would not be used, consumed, or disposed of in
the country of destination, the enterprise must
determine the country of ultimate use,
consumption, or disposition of the property,
services or intangibles or the property, services or
intangibles will be presumed to have been used,
consumed, or disposed of in the United States.
(b) For purposes of section 11, receipts shall
not include any receipts derived from the sale of
goods, provision of services or licensing of
intangibles to unrelated parties in a foreign
jurisdiction unless the taxpayer establishes to the
satisfaction of the secretary that such receipts are
subject to an effective rate of income tax imposed
by that foreign jurisdiction greater than 50 percent
of the maximum rate of tax specified in section 11.
7. Simplification.
The following sections of 26 USC are hereby
repealed: sections 59A, 245A, 250, 863, 864, 871(b),
881(b), 901, 903, 904, 905, 951, 951A, 952, 953, 954,
955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960.
8. Effective date.
This Act shall be effective as of January 1,
20XX.
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